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National Foreign Assessment Center

31 December 1981

General Dozier's Kidnapping: An Update

Two weeks after the kidnapping, the Red Brigades have issued two communiques but as yet have made no demands on the US or Italian governments for Dozier's safe return. The communiques suggest that the Brigades have expanded their political objectives to include European security issues as well as "class war" against the Italian establishment. Italian security forces have made some arrests in the case, but to date have no firm leads as to Dozier's whereabouts. The pace of the incident continues to suggest that the kidnapping will be a protracted affair designed to achieve maximum publicity for the Brigades.

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This memorandum was prepared for the Office for Combatting Terrorism, State Department by [redacted] of the International Terrorism Center, Office of Global Issues. It contains information received by 1200, 31 December 1981. Questions and comments should be directed to the Chief, International Terrorism Center at [redacted]

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The Communiques

[redacted] the language of the communiques suggest they were prepared by members of the Venetian column of the Brigades. The vituperative tone and the references to General Dozier as a "pig" resemble the Venetian column's communiques during the kidnapping and eventual murder of Italian businessman Taeliercio this spring. [redacted]

The communiques represent a continuation of a shift away from focus on the class struggle within Italy and towards more international topics. A Brigades' propaganda pamphlet earlier this fall critiqued such issues as TNF and neutron bomb production and went into some detail as to how the Brigades perceived Italy's NATO role. While the most recent communique is more polemical than the earlier document, the basic anti-NATO thrust of the Brigades' current operating strategy is clear.

[redacted]

Like the RAF in West Germany, the Brigades have obviously been impressed by the size and intensity of the "peace movement" in Western Europe and are seeking to capitalize on it. By publicly identifying itself with such a mass movement, the Brigades are attempting to usurp a leadership position within the movement. Like the RAF, the Brigades believe that terrorist acts against NATO targets will gain them new followers and are acceptable acts to elements of the peace movement. [redacted]

Both Brigades communiques call for uniting all revolutionary groups into one movement, and the first communique specifically calls on the Provisional IRA and the Basque ETA to join with the Brigades and the Red Army Faction in fighting imperialism. This is a departure from previous Brigades' propaganda and the statements of imprisoned Brigades members, which categorized ETA and PIRA as fighting wars of national liberation rather than engaging in class warfare. The Brigades have evidently decided that a pan-European front should be established to fight imperialism and are calling on ETA and PIRA to add their considerable resources to the struggle. It seems unlikely, however, that either ETA or the Provos would find much to gain in such an alliance. While it is known that the Brigades and the other three groups have at least passing contacts with one another, it is doubtful that any serious coordinated action by all these groups is feasible. [redacted]

While it is dangerous to read too much into what is essentially a propaganda broadside, the second communique implies that the Brigades have decided to suspend operations against domestic Italian targets and move against US and other NATO targets. The communique suggests some structural changes to the

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Brigades' table of organization, but it is unclear how the renaming of the group and any change in organization will affect future operations. [REDACTED]

The Search

Despite some speculation that General Dozier might have been moved to a neighboring country, Italian authorities believe that the General is in Italy, perhaps in the Milan-Verona-Venice area. We have no evidence that the Brigades in the past have tried to move kidnap victims across national boundaries. The "peoples' prison" where Aldo Moro was held has never been located, but most security experts believe that Moro was never far from Rome, and may have been kept within Rome itself. [REDACTED]

The police have made several arrests in the case, including one key member of the Milan column. The massive and inclusive nature of the search makes it likely that the authorities will apprehend more Brigades members and sympathizers. Thus, the case will have the side-effect of seriously disrupting the organization and its support apparatus. Although none of those arrested to date appears to have first-hand knowledge of the Dozier case, offers of rewards for information and an increased effort by police and security authorities may finally establish some firm leads. [REDACTED]

Despite earlier allegations by SISMI chief Lugaresi and some Italian political leaders that the Dozier kidnapping had a "foreign hand" including possible Libyan, Soviet, or Palestinian involvement, they have been unable to produce any evidence to back these statements. There are some fragmentary reports which may eventually point to some collusion between the Brigades and the West German Red Army Faction. [REDACTED]

Concerns were raised during the Moro kidnapping that the RAF had played an operational role in that case. [REDACTED]

Near Term Prognosis

The Brigades are likely to continue to prolong the case in order to milk the case of its maximum publicity value. Future

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communiqués will probably become more focused on specific demands on the US and Italian government, including termination of agreements to station cruise missiles in Italy, reduction of the US military presence in Italy, an end to the stationing of the Sixth Fleet in Naples, and a demand that Italy not involve itself in theater nuclear force modernization. [REDACTED]

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Brigades' references to "prisons" in their communiqués may foreshadow demands for blanket amnesty for imprisoned members or the release of key group leaders. The group may also demand that the Italian media publish Brigades' propaganda. [REDACTED]

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We believe there are several factors now militating against his safe return:

- The Venetian column, which apparently provided most of the operational assets for the kidnapping, murdered its last kidnap victim.
- The Brigades may decide that Dozier's murder would be a major blow, destabilizing the Italian government and resulting in massive governmental overreaction, including suspension of civil liberties. In such a scenario, terrorist theoreticians posit a massive spontaneous "peoples' uprising."
- The Brigades may calculate that the public would regard the release of Dozier unharmed as a defeat in light of the firm, no-concessions stand by the government.
- The accidental discovery of the "peoples' prison" and an immediate assault by security forces. In such an unstructured incident, the Brigades are likely to resist, and Dozier's chances for survival would be minimal. [REDACTED]

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Factors favoring Dozier's safe return include the following:

- Senior members of the Brigades may believe that killing the General would create public revulsion on a scale as large or larger than the murder of Moro. Most senior Brigades members believe that Moro's murder was a mistake, and that favorable publicity gained during the operation was lost when Moro was murdered.
- The Italian government might make concessions short of giving in to Brigades' demands on NATO issues. In the cases of Judge D'Urso and Cirillo, the Italian government quietly acceded to some demands for the safe release despite public pronouncements of no concessions.

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--The Brigades may believe that the murder of General Dozier would cause a crack-down on such a scale and with such intensity that the group could not survive. The Brigades, like other terrorist groups, are aware of the demise of the Uruguayan Tupamoros after they murdered US AID official Daniel Mittrione.

Given the probable long duration of this case, other factors may arise that would have a bearing on the chances for General Dozier's safe return. At the moment the initiative is with the Brigades, and they will continue to control the pace of the incident unless the Italian government is able to modify the scenario. One way might be to implement plans to cut off communications between imprisoned Brigades' leaders and their at-large members. Other options would include warnings of draconian reprisals should the General be murdered, solicitation of the help of illegal entities such as the Mafia, and an expanded "internationalization" of the search effort. These efforts might help the government regain the initiative and put the Brigades on the defensive. In such a scenario, the Brigades would have to alter their plans; once they have diverted from their carefully thought out game-plan, the chances for a Brigades' mistake increase. [REDACTED]

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There is a strong possibility that the Brigades will try to kidnap another US official or attack a NATO installation in the near term to increase the pressure on the Italian government.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Brigades also may have decided to attack senior Italian politicians. Communique number two singles out Socialist Party Secretary Craxi several times. [REDACTED]

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